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THE BELL TOLLS FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
OR Whom the Bell Tolls, Ernest Hemingway’s
novel about the Spanish Civil War, ends with
its American hero, Robert Jordan, mortally
wounded and trying to decide whether to commit
suicide with a machine gun or risk capture by trying
to retain consciousness long enough to cover the re-
treat of his comrades. Confronting his impending
death, Jordan thinks, “Dying is only bad when it
takes a long time and hurts so much that it humili-
ates you.” Hemingway, one of the most American of
American writers, committed suicide with a shot-
gun. Most suicides in the United States are commit-
ted with guns, but this country has no monopoly on
suicide. Only in the United States, however, have
groups of physicians gone to court to argue that sui-
cide by drug overdose in the context of a doctor–
patient relationship should have the status of a con-
stitutional right.
The physicians, like Hemingway, describe suicide
as a way to exercise control and assert autonomy.
Many Americans die horrible deaths under medical
care. The overall debate about how to make death
better for patients and their families is complicated,
multifaceted, and perhaps unresolvable. The debate
about a constitutional right to physician-assisted sui-
cide, on the other hand, was abruptly ended on June
26, 1997, the day the U.S. Supreme Court issued
two unanimous rulings on the issue.1,2
THE CIRCUIT-COURT OPINIONS
The Court reviewed two opinions. The first, Com-
passion in Dying v. Washington,3 is the opinion of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the state of
Washington’s law against assisted suicide is unconsti-
tutional as applied to physicians and their terminally
ill patients because it violates a person’s fundamental
right to determine the time and manner of his or her
death. The other opinion, Quill v. Vacco,4 is the opin-
ion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that
New York’s laws against assisted suicide are uncon-
stitutional when applied to physicians treating ter-
minally ill patients who are not connected to life-
support systems, because the laws do not provide
these patients with equal protection. The court rea-
soned that patients connected to life-support sys-
tems can refuse to remain connected to them and
thus hasten their deaths, whereas patients not con-
F
nected to such systems cannot exercise the same le-
gal right to hasten their deaths.
Because of the extremely high value Americans
place on autonomy and because of our reasonable
fear of pain, dependency, and loss of control during
the process of dying, these opinions garnered much
popular support. Nonetheless, the legal reasoning
on which they were based was very weak. As I con-
cluded in the Journal last year, “By failing to make
such basic distinctions as those between the right to
refuse treatment and the right to die, between sui-
cide and assisted suicide, between law and ethics,
and between ends and means, these courts virtually
guarantee that their decisions will not be the last
word on the subject.”5
The last word has now been written by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The two unanimous rulings — by
a Court that is usually divided in important cases —
are overwhelming and conclusive. Both opinions
were written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
Five justices also wrote concurring opinions.
There were two questions before the Court: Is
there a constitutional right to assistance in suicide,
and is the right to refuse treatment the same as a right
to receive assistance in committing suicide? The first
question was addressed in the appeal of the Ninth
Circuit Court’s opinion on Washington’s law (Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg)1; the second was addressed in
the appeal of the Second Circuit Court’s opinion on
New York’s law (Vacco v. Quill ).2
WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
The question before the Court in the appeal of
the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinion was “whether the
‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process
Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] includes a
right to commit suicide which itself includes a right
to assistance in doing so.”1 The Court’s “established
method” of defining a new constitutional right has
two parts: the right must be “deeply rooted in this
nation’s history and tradition,” or fundamental to
ordered liberty, and must have a “careful descrip-
tion.”1 (Rights fundamental to ordered liberty are,
in legal parlance, the rights the justices see as essen-
tial to individual liberty in our society, even though
they may not appear in the text of the Constitution.)
The Court easily concluded that there is no historic
tradition of treating suicide as a fundamental right,
observing that to uphold such a right, the Court
would “have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine
and practice, and strike down the considered policy
choice of almost every state.”1 In a review of the his-
tory of laws against suicide and assisted suicide, the
Court noted that suicide was decriminalized because
it was impossible to punish the person and because
it was seen as “unfair to punish the suicide’s family
for his wrongdoing.”1 Nonetheless, suicide “re-
mained a grievous, though nonfelonious, wrong.”
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The Court also reviewed the Ninth Circuit
Court’s reliance on Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dept. of Health6 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey7
as sources of a new right to commit suicide. The
Court characterized the case of Nancy Cruzan, a
young woman in a persistent vegetative state whose
parents wanted artificial feeding discontinued, as a
case that involved the constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment. This right is supported by the
common-law doctrine of battery and informed con-
sent and by “the long legal tradition protecting the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment.”1 In
contrast, the Court noted, suicide “has never en-
joyed similar legal protection,” and the “two acts
are widely and reasonably regarded as quite dis-
tinct.”1 In Cruzan, the Court said, “We certainly
gave no intimation” that the right to refuse treat-
ment could be “somehow transmuted into a right
to assistance in committing suicide.”1 The Court
dealt even more summarily with Casey, its most re-
cent ruling on abortion, noting simply that the
right to abortion does not support “the sweeping
conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and
personal decisions” are protected by the U.S. Con-
stitution.1 Washington’s law against assisted suicide
withstands constitutional review, according to the
Court, because it “does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, either on its face or ‘as applied to
competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten
their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by
their doctors.’”1
Because the Court concluded that no fundamen-
tal constitutional right to assisted suicide can be
found in our nation’s history or in the concept of or-
dered liberty, Washington had only to demonstrate
that its assisted-suicide law was “rationally related to
legitimate government interests.”1 The Court stat-
ed, “This requirement is unquestionably met here,”
and listed the following legitimate government in-
terests: preserving human life; preventing suicide;
protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession; protecting vulnerable groups from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes; and preventing a start “down
the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia.”1 As for the slippery slope, the Court
noted that the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinion seemed
to permit surrogate decision making and, in some
cases, lethal injection by a physician or family mem-
ber. Therefore, the Court concluded, “It turns out
that what is couched as a limited right to ‘physician-
assisted suicide’ is likely, in effect, a much broader
license, which could prove extremely difficult to po-
lice and contain. Washington’s ban on assisting sui-
cide prevents such erosion.”1
VACCO V. QUILL
In the appeal of the Second Circuit Court’s opin-
ion, the question was whether the state of New York
violated the equal-protection clause of the 14th
Amendment by making it a crime to assist another
person in committing suicide while permitting a pa-
tient to refuse life-saving treatment. The Supreme
Court held that “it does not.”2
The equal-protection clause “embodies a general
rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat
unlike cases accordingly.”2 Unless the statute “bur-
dens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class,” it
will be upheld as long as it bears “a rational relation
to some legitimate end.”1 In Washington v. Glucks-
berg, the Court concluded that statutes outlawing as-
sisted suicide do not infringe on fundamental rights
or involve a suspect classification1 and are reasonably
related to legitimate state interests.2 Therefore, the
only real question in Vacco v. Quill was whether there
is a rational difference between assisting a competent
patient to commit suicide and withdrawing life-sus-
taining treatment from a competent patient who re-
fuses to consent to its continuation. The Court an-
swered this question at the outset, stating that New
York’s laws draw no distinctions among people, but
instead treat all New York citizens the same: “Every-
one, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if
competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.”2
The lower court had concluded that since discon-
tinuing or refusing life-sustaining medical treatment
is “nothing more nor less than assisting suicide,”
laws prohibiting terminally ill people who are not re-
ceiving life-sustaining treatment from ending their
lives with assistance deny them equal protection of
the laws.4 The Supreme Court emphatically disagreed,
specifically upholding as rational the distinction be-
tween withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and pro-
viding assistance with suicide, “a distinction widely
recognized and endorsed in the medical profession
and in our legal traditions.”2
The Court did not see as legally relevant the often-
discussed distinctions between active and passive eu-
thanasia or between the provision of artificial fluids
and nutrition and other medical interventions. In-
stead, the Court explained, causation and intent are
the two critical questions in this area of the criminal
law. As to causation, the Court agreed with previous
court rulings that “when a patient refuses life-sus-
taining medical treatment, he dies from an underly-
ing fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests
lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is
killed by that medication.”2 Since medications pre-
scribed for a legitimate medical purpose can also car-
ry a risk of death, the primary distinction in cases
involving such a risk is the physician’s intent in pre-
scribing or administering the medications. In the
Court’s words, when a physician provides aggressive
palliative care, “in some cases, painkilling drugs may
hasten a patient’s death, but the physician’s purpose
and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient’s
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pain.”2 On the other hand, a doctor who assists a pa-
tient in committing suicide necessarily intends that
the patient die. Similarly, a patient who commits sui-
cide with a doctor’s aid “necessarily has the specific
intent to end his or her own life, while a patient who
refuses or discontinues treatment might not.”2 
The Court noted that the law has historically dis-
tinguished between actions performed “because of ”
a given end and actions performed “in spite of” their
unintended but foreseen consequences. Intent mat-
ters. The Court cited Judge Andrew Kleinfeld’s ex-
ample, in his dissenting opinion in Compassion in
Dying v. Washington,3 of General Dwight Eisenhow-
er, who ordered American soldiers into battle to lib-
erate Europe, knowing that many would certainly
die because of his order.2 If only the outcome, not
Eisenhower’s intent, had mattered, his order would
have been the moral equivalent of ordering the mur-
der of American soldiers at the hands of the Nazis.3
The Court observed that other courts have rou-
tinely made the distinction between refusing treat-
ment and committing suicide, citing 34 prior deci-
sions. Virtually all the states have also adopted the
distinction in their statutes. Moreover, the Court
said that in Cruzan,6 it had “recognized, at least im-
plicitly, the distinction between letting a patient die
and making that patient die.”2 The decision in Cru-
zan, the Court said, was based not on the recogni-
tion of any “general and abstract ‘right to hasten
death . . .’ but on well-established, traditional rights
to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted
touching.”2 The Court therefore (not surprisingly)
concluded, “By permitting everyone to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment while prohibiting anyone
from assisting a suicide, New York follows a long-
standing and rational distinction.”2
The oral argument, which the Court heard on
January 8, focused on the example of “terminal se-
dation,”8 better described as sedation of the immi-
nently dying. Although the Court’s discussion of
terminal sedation was relegated to a footnote, it is
nonetheless important, because the Court applied to
this example the reasoning outlined in its opinion.
Even accepting the bizarre characterization of “ter-
minal sedation” as “inducing barbiturate coma and
then starving the person to death,” the Court con-
cluded that a state can legally countenance this form
of palliative care if it is “based on informed consent
and the double effect. Just as a state may prohibit as-
sisting suicide while permitting patients to refuse
unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit pallia-
tive care related to that refusal, which may have the
foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’ of hastening
the patient’s death.”2
THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
There were five votes for each of the Court’s
opinions written by the Chief Justice (his own vote
and the votes of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor,
Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence
Thomas). All nine justices agreed that state laws pro-
hibiting assisted suicide violate neither the due-proc-
ess clause nor the equal-protection clause of the
14th Amendment, even as applied to physicians who
prescribe overdoses of medications to competent,
terminally ill patients who want to commit suicide.
Nonetheless, five justices wrote concurring opinions
to express additional or different reasons for this
conclusion.
Justice O’Connor wrote a four-paragraph opin-
ion, the only concurring opinion that any other jus-
tice agreed with, that suggests she believes patients
near death may have a right to avoid “great” suffer-
ing. She made three points. First, in both Washing-
ton and New York, there are no laws preventing “a
patient who is experiencing great pain” from “ob-
taining medication, from qualified physicians, to al-
leviate that suffering, even to the point of causing
unconsciousness and hastening death.” Second, the
state’s interests therefore justify prohibiting physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Third, state legislatures are the
proper forum for an “extensive and serious evalua-
tion of physician-assisted suicide and other related
issues.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred with the
Court’s judgments in both opinions, “substantially
for the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor.” Justice
Stephen Breyer also agreed with Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, “except insofar as it joins the majority.” It
is difficult to tell exactly what Justice Breyer meant,
but he expressed concern about dying patients who
receive insufficient medication for pain. He conclud-
ed that if a state ever prohibited physicians from pro-
viding sufficient palliative care, “including the ad-
ministration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the
end of life,” the Court would be presented with a
different case “and might have to revisit its conclu-
sions.”
Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter each
wrote much longer concurring opinions. Justice
Stevens concluded that it is possible that some other
particular case (which he does not describe) might
impose “an intolerable intrusion on the patient’s
freedom” by outlawing “the only possible means of
preserving a dying patient’s dignity and alleviating
her intolerable suffering.” Justice Souter seems to
favor a right to end one’s life with dignity that would
apply not only to a person dying in pain but also to
a person dying in a state of unacceptable “depend-
ency and hopelessness.” He nonetheless concluded
that too little is known about the real-world effect
of such a right for the Court to act, noting that “the
case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here”
and that “legislatures have superior opportunities to
obtain the facts necessary for a judgment about the
present controversy.”
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND STATE 
INTERESTS
In retrospect, it is easy to see why the right to
physician-assisted suicide failed to gain constitution-
al recognition by the Supreme Court. First, to have
upheld such a constitutional right, the Court would
have had to find a constitutional right to suicide it-
self, and there is no historical or legal support for
such a right. Second, the analogies the proponents
of assisted suicide relied on — the right to have an
abortion and the right to refuse treatment — are
clearly distinguishable from the right to receive as-
sistance with suicide. The Court remains deeply di-
vided on the question of abortion, and notwith-
standing some expansive language, Casey limited
rather than expanded the abortion rights articulated
in Roe v. Wade.9 The right to refuse treatment is
deeply rooted in American law, and so are the prin-
ciples of intent and causation in the criminal law.
These principles distinguish suicide from the refusal
of treatment, and assisted suicide from the with-
drawal or withholding of treatment. These distinc-
tions have been made by the courts in virtually every
case since Quinlan,10 as well as by virtually every
state legislature that has passed laws governing living
wills and health care proxies. Third, to agree with
the proponents of physician-assisted suicide, the
Court would have had to limit any constitutional
right it found to a small group of citizens (compe-
tent, pain-wracked, terminally ill people near death)
and a particular method of suicide (an overdose of
prescribed drugs) — limitations that have no basis
in any constitutional principle.
To uphold the Washington and New York statutes
outlawing assisted suicide, the Court had only to
find that they were “rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.” Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to
conclude that a majority of the justices would have
permitted the states to continue to outlaw physi-
cian-assisted suicide even if they had thought it was
a fundamental constitutional right, because at least
some of these interests, especially avoiding a slide
down the slippery slope to active euthanasia, are
compelling. In the future, a state supreme court
could thus find a limited right to assistance in sui-
cide in the state’s constitution but nonetheless up-
hold laws prohibiting assisted suicide because the
state’s interest in avoiding a slide from assisted sui-
cide to euthanasia is compelling. In the first test of
this kind, the Florida Supreme Court in July re-
versed a lower court’s ruling that the right of privacy
in Florida’s constitution includes a right to a physi-
cian’s assistance with suicide at the end of life. The
Florida Supreme Court, in a five-to-one opinion,
concluded that the privacy right is not this broad
and that in any event, the state has at least three
compelling interests that “clearly outweigh” the pe-
titioner’s desire for assistance in committing suicide:
the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide,
and maintenance of the ethical integrity of the med-
ical profession.11
DRUG PRESCRIPTIONS, CAUSATION, 
AND MORPHINE
Although it explicitly endorsed the principle of
the double effect, the Court did not directly apply
the principle to writing drug prescriptions. Nonethe-
less, the logic of the opinion supports the conclu-
sion that physicians can continue to write prescrip-
tions for medically indicated drugs even with the
knowledge that the patient might use the drugs to
commit suicide, as long as the physician’s intent is to
prolong the patient’s life or relieve pain. A physician
who writes a drug prescription under these circum-
stances is, by legal definition, not engaged in physi-
cian-assisted suicide.
The Court’s opinions can also be read as a strong
endorsement of the views of the New York State
Task Force on Life and the Law, whose 1994 report,
When Death Is Sought, is cited frequently by the
justices.12 The New York task force is important
because it is the only long-standing, government-
sponsored, multidisciplinary group that has carefully
studied the issue of physician-assisted suicide with a
view toward proposing legislation, as well as the
only authoritative group to report its conclusions
both before and after the cases in the Second and
Ninth Circuits were decided.12,13 The task force has
been especially critical of the argument that the prin-
ciple of autonomy justifies physician-assisted suicide.
During the oral argument, for example, Justice
Kennedy cited the task force’s view that in this con-
text, autonomy is “illusory” and that because the le-
galization of assisted suicide puts the vulnerable, the
mentally ill, and the poor at risk, it could actually
diminish choices, not increase them, and will in-
crease fear.
The task force wrote a supplement to its 1994 re-
port in April 1997. Although none of the justices
cited this supplement, their opinions are consistent
with its logic and conclusions. Two points that the
task force makes are worth emphasizing. The first
concerns legal causation, which is used by the courts
to determine legal accountability, not simply to de-
scribe facts. In the context of a physician’s care of a
dying patient, many causes may contribute to the
patient’s death. But, as the task force properly ob-
serves, “When a variety of factual causes are neces-
sary, but not individually sufficient, to bring about a
particular result, the determination of which among
them are properly cited as causative for legal purposes
becomes a policy judgment, reflecting underlying as-
sumptions about rights, duties, and moral blame.”13,14
The Court’s views of “rights, duties, and moral
blame” explain why a physician is not held account-
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able as a causal agent for a death that occurs after
life-sustaining treatment has been removed at the
patient’s insistence or while a patient is undergoing
surgery. The courts have always recognized that the
death of a patient under medical care does not occur
in a moral vacuum.
The second point is emphasized in all the concur-
ring opinions: “The effort to characterize morphine
drips as a form of covert euthanasia is extremely mis-
guided.”13 This characterization is a mistake for two
reasons. The first reason is factual: morphine is often
necessary for proper medical care, and it is never
necessary to use it with “winks and nods.” Death is
not necessarily either hastened or intended when
intravenous morphine is administered.15-17 When
properly titrated, morphine usually does not hasten
death at all, because of “the rapid development of
tolerance to the respiratory depressant effects.”13
The second reason is that even in the cases in which
increasing the morphine dosage may hasten the pa-
tient’s death, this fact “does not make [its] use
equivalent to assisted suicide or euthanasia.”13 The
question is whether the risk of death is “justified in
light of the paucity and undesirability of other op-
tions.”13 This point and the centrality of the princi-
ple of the double effect are well recognized in med-
ical practice: “Medical treatment sometimes requires
significant trade-offs, and acceptance of negative
consequences for legitimate medical purposes is not
equivalent to causing those consequences for their
own sake.”13
DEATH AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The quest for a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide failed in the Supreme Court because
it has no coherent basis in constitutional law. The
right to refuse treatment, on the other hand, is a
long-recognized right that physicians are legally and
ethically required to honor. Patients have a right to
insist that their bodies not be invaded without their
consent. Likewise, the right to have an abortion is
fundamentally different from the “right to die” in
several respects. The right to have an abortion pro-
tects (rather than ends) a pregnant woman’s life,
health, and future, and it can be exercised by a clearly
identifiable category of citizens (pregnant women).
In addition, a physician must perform an abortion,
because (unlike suicide) it is a medical procedure that
cannot be safely or effectively performed by the wom-
an herself.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s rulings, only
physicians who really believe that there is no distinc-
tion between prescribing drugs that patients might
use to commit suicide and giving them loaded guns
with the intention that the patients shoot themselves
need to reevaluate their medical practices and inten-
tions to comply with the laws against homicide and
assisted suicide. Doctors who provide palliative care
with the primary intention of relieving pain and suf-
fering, and with the patient’s consent, are strongly
encouraged to continue to do so by the Court. In-
deed, at least five members of the Court seem to
think there is something akin to a “right not to suf-
fer,” at least when death is imminent. Their concur-
ring opinions can be read as a warning to the states
not to adopt restrictive statutes that prohibit or in-
hibit physicians from doing everything in their med-
ical power to prevent suffering.
These opinions make no change in the states’ au-
thority to outlaw or decriminalize assisted suicide.
The real issue has never been what the states can do,
but what they should do. There are proposals for
pain-relief laws, but they are not, and should not be,
limited to the terminally ill, and no new laws are
needed to improve the care of the dying. Moreover,
to the extent that physicians ask state legislatures for
further regulation of prescriptions or the administra-
tion of medications near the end of life, treatment
of the dying is likely to get worse, not better.18-20
There is no simple legal solution to our problems
with addressing the needs of persons who are dy-
ing.21 The failed attempts to establish a constitu-
tional right to physician-assisted suicide should be
seen as a symptom of these problems, not a solution.
Hemingway ends his novel as Robert Jordan is
waiting for an enemy “to reach the sunlit place
where the first trees of the pine forest joined the
green slope of the meadow” and feeling “his heart
beating against the pine needle floor of the forest.”
It is possible to romanticize war, killing, and death
only by turning away from them and describing
something else. The bell has tolled for a constitution-
al right to physician-assisted suicide, but it should
awaken us to the challenge that remains: to face and
deal directly with death and dying. 
Professor Annas was a coauthor with Leonard Glantz and Wendy Mari-
ner of the Bioethics Professors’ amicus brief, which argued that neither the
right to refuse treatment nor the right to abortion provided a constitution-
al precedent supporting a right to physician-assisted suicide. The full text
of the brief is available on the World Wide Web (see http://www-busph.
bu.edu/Depts/HealthLaw).
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